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ANCIENT FORESTS AND THE SUPREME
COURT: ISSUING A BLANK CHECK FOR
APPROPRIATION RIDERS
MICHAEL C. BLUMM*

The battle over the fate of ancient forests in the Pacific Northwest
reached the Marble Palace in 1992; the result was mostly puzzling and
potentially unsettling. In Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society,' the
Supreme Court upheld an appropriations rider, known as the Northwest Timber Compromise, which authorized timber sales in certain ancient forest areas during fiscal year 1990.2 In a unanimous decision
authored by Justice Thomas, his first environmental law opinion,' the
* Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. My research assistants, Dave
Cummings and Jack Sterne, provided able assistance with the footnotes, and the LL.M.
Seminar in Environmental Law at Lewis and Clark helped clarify my thinking. Thanks
especially to Ken Murchison, Joris Naimen, and Adam Torer for their helpful
comments.
1. 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
2. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745-750 (1989).
3. Judge Thomas' only previous environmental law majority opinion came in Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 616 (1991), where the District of Columbia Circuit upheld a Federal Aviation Administration environmental impact statement (EIS) on the proposed expansion of the
Toledo Airport, even though the EIS failed to consider alternative sites and accepted
self-serving statements from the grant applicant. Id. at 197-98, 201-02. Judge Buckley
dissented, claiming that the majority ignored long-settled National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) principles dictating disinterestedness and consideration of all reasonable alternatives and charging that the decision transformed the Airports and Airways
Improvement Act into an urban welfare statute. Id. at 209-10 (Buckley, J., dissenting).
See also Cross-Sound Ferry Services, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 934 F.2d
327, 336 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Thomas, J., concurring)(finding that party plaintiff lacked
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Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the rider violated the
separation of powers doctrine because it directed the outcome of pending litigation without amending the statutes underlying the litigation.4
The campaign to preserve the remaining ancient forests of the Pacific
slope has received widespread publicity, 5 has been the subject of considerable litigation,6 and was a centerpiece in the 1992 elections.7 In
February 1992, a Cabinet-level committee, popularly known as the
"God Squad," issued the second exemption ever granted under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), allowing thirteen timber sales to proceed
despite the United States Fish and Wildlife Service's finding that the
sales would jeopardize the continued existence of the northern spotted
owl.8 Even so, most of the ancient forests in western Oregon and western Washington remain under court injunction for violations of various
environmental laws. 9 As a result, there are now widespread calls for
standing because its claim under NEPA and the Coastal Zone Management Act could
not be redressed by judicial decision).
4. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
5. Jimmy Carter, Salmon Swimming Against Logging Tide, U.S.A. TODAY, June 22,
1992, at 13A (noting that the "altercation over the endangered spotted owl is just one
small part of the overall environmental crisis"); Michael Fisher, How Much to Cut, How
Much to Spare, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 23, 1992, at 19 (criticizing the Bush

Administration's policy of exploiting the national forests as a source of timber and destroying the habitat of endangered species, including the spotted owl); Michael D.
Lemonick, Whose Woods Are These?, TIME, Dec. 9, 1991, at 70 (discussing the increasing intensity of the conflict between conservationists and the logging industry with respect to America's old-growth forests).
6. See infra notes 9, 28-30 for a discussion of representative cases involving the
ancient forests.
7. See Terry Atlas, Owls Lose a HabitatBattle; While House Acts to Save Logging
Jobs, CHI. TRIB., May 15, 1992, at 1. See also Crossfire: A Hostile Environment?
(CNN television broadcast, Sept. 14, 1992) (discussing the 1992 Presidential candidates'
positions regarding logging in the Pacific Northwest).
8. Endangered Species Committee, Decision, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,405-08 (1992) (deciding to permit 13 of 44 timber sales requested by the Bureau of Land Management). See
also Kathie Durbin & Roberta Ulrich, 13 Timber Sales Get Go-Ahead, THE OREGONIAN, May 15, 1992, at Al, A20 (discussing the "God Squad's" decision to exempt 13
of the disputed timber sales from the requirements of the ESA).
9. Lane County Audubon Soc'y v. Jamison, 958 F.2d 290, 295 (9th Cir. 1992)
(Ninth Circuit's order enjoining the BLM's strategy for protecting the spotted owl because the agency failed to satisfy the ESA by consulting with the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service); Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484, 1493-94 (W.D.
Wash. 1992) (Judge Dwyer's order enjoining Forest Service timber sale in the spotted
owl's habitat until Forest Service adopts revised standards and guidelines in compliance
with NEPA and the National Forest Management Act and directing the Forest Service
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Congress to amend the ESA. 10
The Supreme Court marched into this highly charged atmosphere
when it granted certiorari in Robertson on June 28, 1991.11 The
Court's holding may have surprised those who thought the Rehnquist
Court would attempt to draw clearer lines in the shifting sands of separation of powers jurisprudence,12 but the decision continued a pattern
of hostility toward environmental plaintiffs." a While the case may reflect the Court's receptivity to plenary congressional control over federal court jurisdiction, it actually establishes little or no new ground
and overrules no precedent. Robertson does, however, indicate that the
to prepare a supplemental EIS in compliance with NEPA by August 20, 1993), stay
denied, 798 F. Supp. 1494, 1499 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Portland Audubon Soe'y v. Lujan,
784 F. Supp. 786, 792 (D. Or. 1992) (Judge Frye's order enjoining the BLM's 1992
timber sales that would log in northern spotted owl habitat until BLM submits a supplemental EIS examining new information on the effects of logging on the northern spotted
owl as required by NEPA), stay denied, 795 F. Supp. 1489, 1510-11 (D. Or. 1992).
10. Legislators introduced no fewer than eight bills amending the Endangered Species Act during the 102d Congress: S. 3286, 102d Cong. 2d Sess. (1992) (Seymour)(providing for a loan program for states and political subdivisions of states); S.
3159, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (Symms)(providing a means to preserve endangered
and threatened species and their habitat needs and balancing such needs with the needs
of human beings); S. 2953, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (Metzenbaum)(clarifying citizen
suit provision of the ESA); H.R. 5105, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (Chandler)(ensuring
adequate analysis before the application of requirements and prohibitions under the
ESA to a species); H.R. 4058, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Dannemeyer)(requiring the
preparation of economic impact analysis with respect to certain actions to protect endangered and threatened species); H.R. 4045, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
(Studds)(strengthening programs for the conservation of threatened and endangered
species); S. 47, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (Johnston)(same as H.R. 1478).
11. 111 S. Ct. 2886 (1991).
12. See, eg., Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINE, THE POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 121-60 (1992) (discussing the Court's rulings on and reactions to
the legislative veto, the Gramm-Rudman Deficit Reduction Act, and the independent
counsel legislation). See also infra note 91 for additional examples of the Court's separation of powers jurisprudence.
13. No environmental plaintiff has prevailed in the Supreme Court since Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 81, 84 (1978) (affirming
plaintiffs' standing but rejecting their claim regarding the unconstitutionality of the
Price-Anderson Act) and Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1978)
(upholding order enjoining construction of the Tellico Dam because it violated the Endangered Species Act). The Court decided those two cases within two weeks of each
other in June of 1978. For an overview of the Supreme Court's "retreat from judicial
oversight" in environmental cases, see Kenneth M. Murchison, Does NEPA Matter? An Analysis of the HistoricalDevelopment and Contemporary Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 557, 592-602 (1984). See also
sources cited infra note 120.
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Justices see no judicial responsibility to promote informed legislative

action. Robertson's real legacy has less to do with ancient forests and
timber harvesting than with the Rehnquist Court's willingness to defer
to congressional control over pending litigation and the Court's unwillingness to require Congress to legislate according to its own rules.
Part I of this Article supplies background on the ancient forest fight,
focusing on the events leading to the enactment of the "Northwest
Timber Compromise" in late 1989. Part II examines the Robertson
litigation in the lower courts and the Supreme Court. Part III explores
Robertson's legacy regarding the process of making public land law and
analyzes what the decision signals about Justice Thomas' judicial
philosophy.
I.

THE CONTEXT

The roots of the Robertson case sprouted in the late 1960s when
scientists began to study the northern spotted owl and its habitat, the
Pacific Northwest old growth ecosystems. This area is an intensively
logged public forest managed by the Forest Service and the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM). 14 Studies revealed a close association between old growth forests and the survival of the northern spotted
14. See INTERAGENCY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE TO ADDRESS THE CONSERVATION
OF THE NORTHERN SPOTrED OwL, A CONSERVATION STRATEGY FOR THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OwL, 51-56 (1990) [hereinafter INTERAGENCY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE]
(containing a thorough history of spotted owl management from the early 1970s until
late 1989). See also Alyson C. Flournoy, Beyond the "Spotted Owl Problem' Learning
from the Old-Growth Controversy, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1993) (no
single definition of "old growth" exists, although the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service considers the term to require a mature conifer forest with fallen logs and dead
standing trees); U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, Critical Habitatfor the Northern Spotted
Owl 66-70 (Jan. 1992); Victor M. Sher & Andy Stahl, Spotted Owls, Ancient Forests,
Courts and Congress: An Overview of Citizens' Efforts to ProtectOld-Growth Forests and
the Species that Live in Them, 6 N.W. ENVTL. J. 361, 362-63 (1990) (discussing the
early studies done off the northern spotted owl).
The U.S. Forest Service manages 24.5 million acres of federal public lands in 19 national forests and one national grassland in the Pacific Northwest under the directives of
the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1988 and
Supp. III 1991). Accord, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOREST
SERVICE, PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGION, REGIONAL GUIDE FOR THE PACIFIC
NORTHWEST REGION 2-1 (1984) [hereinafter REGIONAL GUIDE] (noting that the For-

est Service not only manages 24.5 million acres of public lands in the Northwest Region, but also cooperatively protects and manages 20.5 million acres of commercial
forest lands in the region). See generally Symposium, FederalForestLaw and Policy, 17
ENVTL. L. 365 (1987) (discussing various aspects of NFMA); Charles F. Wilkinson &
H. Michael Anderson, Land and Resources Planningin the NationalForests, 64 OR. L.
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owl. 15 After some initial resistance, the land management agencies
adopted the recommendations of an interagency committee to provide
interim habitat protection for the owl by supplying three hundred acres
of protection from logging around each spotted owl nest. 16 The BLM's
timber management plans for each of its seven districts incorporated
this interim protection by the early 1980s. 7 In 1984, the Forest Service amended its nineteen forest plans in the region to incorporate similar protections."'
Expanding knowledge about the owl and its biological requirements
quickly outpaced the initial attempts to provide habitat protection. By
the early 1980s, an interagency team of biologists recommended protecting one thousand acres of old growth forest within a seven-and-ahalf mile radius of spotted owl nests. 19 In 1985, a "blue ribbon" panel
formed by the National Audubon Society recommended protecting fifteen hundred pairs of spotted owls, nearly three times the number of
breeding pairs the agencies were planning to protect, and advocated
more extensive habitat protection for breeding pairs in the northern
part of the species' habitat.2 ° This new ecological information led environmentalists to challenge the adequacy of the 1984 Regional Guide.
In response, the Forest Service agreed to revise the Guide and prepare
REV. 1 (1985) (examining thoroughly NFMA and its land management policies and
plans).
The Bureau of Land Management manages approximately 2.5 million acres of revested railroad grant lands in southern Oregon under the Oregon and California Railroad Land Grants Act of 1937 (OCLA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1181a-1181f (1988), and the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784
(1988 & Supp. 11 1990). See Paul G. Dodds, The Oregon and CaliforniaLands Act: A
PeculiarHistory Produces Environmental Problems, 17 ENVTL. L. 739, 739-40 (1987).
15. See Determination of Threatened Status for the Northwest Spotted Owl, 55
Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,117 (1990) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17) (noting "a strong
association of [spotted owl] roost sites with old forests"). See also Mark Bonnett &
Kurt Zimmerman, Politics and Preservation: The Endangered Species Act and the
NorthernSpotted Owl, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 105, 114-29 (1991) (discussing the relationship
between the extinction of the northern spotted owl and the decline of the old-growth
forests in the Pacific Northwest).
16. INTERAGENCY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE, supra note 14, at 52-53. The 300 acres
represented a "core area" of protection of a management area of 1200 acres; outside the
core area, 50% of the remaining 900 acres were to be covered by forests older than 30
years. Id. at 52.
17. Id. at 53.
18.
19.

REGIONAL GUIDE, supra note 14, at 3-15, C-4.
See INTERAGENCY SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE, supra note 14, at 53.

20. See id. at 55.
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a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS).2 1 In 1987
BLM considered revising its spotted owl protection in response to pressure from environmental groups.2 2 BLM declined to prepare a SEIS,
timber
however, even though it intended to offer over two hundred
23
years.
three
next
the
during
habitat
owl
spotted
in
sales
BLM's action induced a coalition of environmental organizations to
file suit in the federal district of Oregon in late 1987. The coalition
alleged that BLM's failure to perform an SEIS in light of new information on the owl violated the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA).2 4 The claim that the land managers ignored developments in
ecological understanding became a persistent theme in the subsequent
litigation. The lawsuit also prompted congressional action, another
persistent theme in the Robertson litigation. Congressional reaction to
litigation and the subsequent lower court response ultimately induced
the Supreme Court to hear the dispute.
In December 1987, two months after the filing of the lawsuit against
BLM, Congress enacted a rider to that year's Department of the Interior appropriations act, which forbade judicial review of land management plans on grounds that such review failed to incorporate all
available information.2 5 The rider allowed challenges to activities,
such as individual timber sales, carried out under the plan.26 This statute, the forerunner of the provision at issue in Robertson, was reenacted in each of the two succeeding years.2 7 The statute induced much
21. See Michael C. Blumm, Ancient Forests,Spotted Owls, and Modern PublicLand
Law, 18 B.C. ENVTL. Arr. L. REv. 605, 612-13 (1991). The Forest Service completed
the SEIS in 1988. Id.
22. Victor M. Sher & Carol Sue Hunting, Erodingthe Landscape,Erodingthe Laws:
Congressional Exemptions from Judicial Review of Environmental Laws, 15 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REv. 435, 453 (1991).
23. Id.
24. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 21,210,
21,210-11 (D. Or. Apr. 20, 1988).
25. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of Fiscal
Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 314, 101 Stat. 1329-214, 1329-254 (1987):
Nothing shall limit judicial review of particular activities on these lands: Provided,
however, That there shall be no challenges to any existing plan... [with respect to
BLM] solely on the basis that the plan does not incorporate information available
subsequent to the completion of the existing plan: Providedfurther, That any and
all particular activities to be carried out under the existing plans may nevertheless
be challenged.

Id.
26. Id.
27. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of Fiscal
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litigation, as a consequence of its ambiguous language.2" Ultimately,
after numerous lower court and appellate court decisions, the Ninth
Circuit determined that, despite the clause allowing challenges to particular activities, the rider barred NEPA challenges to individual timber sales.2 9 The Ninth Circuit apparently based its holding on the
ground that the individual claims merely highlighted systematic flaws
in the plans. However, the court later ruled that the rider was not
permanent, substantive legislation, but rather temporary legislation
which expired with each appropriations bill.3" Although Congress enacted the rider three times," the last version of the rider expired on
September 30, 1990.32
While the environmentalists' litigation against BLM proceeded in
the district court of Oregon, the Forest Service completed its revised
SEIS in late 1988." 3 The SEIS called for expanded owl protection, varying from one thousand acres in southern Oregon to three thousand
acres on Washington's Olympic Peninsula.34 In early 1989, the environmental groups challenged the adequacy of the SEIS in the western
district of Washington, and in March, 1989, the district judge granted
a preliminary injunction. 5 One month later, the Fish and Wildlife
Service, reversing itself after another district court judge voided its iniYear 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989); Department of the
Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No.
100-446, § 314, 102 Stat. 1774, 1825-26 (1988).
28. See Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1989).
29. See, eg., Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Mohla, 895 F.2d 627, 629-30
(9th Cir. 1990); Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 884 F.2d 1233, 1239-40 (9th Cir.

1989). These and subsequent cases are discussed in detail in Sher & Hunting, supra

note 22, at 454-60, and subjected to sustained criticism for their failure to apply the
statute properly, id. at 460-70.

30. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 304 (9th Cir. 1991).
31. See supra notes 25, 27 (enumerating the enactments of the rider).
32. Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989).
33. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOREST SERVICE, PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGION, FINAL SUPPLEMENT TO THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT TO THE PACIFIC

NORTHWEST REGIONAL GUIDE (1988).

34. Id. at 3 (Forest Service's Record of Decision adopting this strategy).
35. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1084 (W.D. Wash.
1991) (citing Order on Motions for Preliminary Injunction and for Change of Venue at
2, Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, No. C89-97 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 24, 1989)).
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tial refusal to protect the northern spotted owl under the Endangered
37
Species Act, 36 proposed to list the owl as a threatened species.
In October 1989, Congress reenacted the appropriation rider for the
third and final time. 38 This time Congress added a new provision, section 318 of the Department of the Interior Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1989 - known as the Hatfield-Adams Northwest Timber
Compromise, 3 9 - which provided expanded protection for the owl for
one year,4° instructed the Forest Service and the BLM to minimize the
41
fragmentation of ecologically significant stands of old growth forests,
36. Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988)
(holding that refusal to list spotted owl was arbitrary and capricious because it disregarded all expert opinion on population viability).
37. See Determination of Threatened Status for the Northern Spotted Owl, 54 Fed.
Reg. 26,666 (1989) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). The listing became final on June
26, 1990. See Determination of Threatened Status for The Northern Spotted Owl, 55
Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1990) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17). Because the Fish and Wildlife Service failed to designate critical habitat for the owl at the time of listing, environmentalists filed suit in the Western District of Washington. The district court found
that failure to designate critical habitat concurrently with the listing was an abuse of
discretion, and ordered the Service to take action. Northern Spotted Owl v. Lujan, 758
F. Supp. 621, 629 (W.D. Wash. 1991). On January 15, 1992, the Service issued a final
rule designating critical habitat. Determination of Critical Habitat for the Northern
Spotted Owl, 57 Fed. Reg. 1796 (1992) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17).
38. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of Fiscal
Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318, 103 Stat. 701, 745-50 (1989).
39. The compromise grew out of the "timber summit" convened by the Oregon
congressional delegation in an attempt to resolve the ancient forest fight by non-adversarial means. However, the summit, which was held in June 1989 and involved environmental, timber industry, and governmental representatives, produced no consensus. It
succeeded only in converting a regional dispute into a national controversy. See Bryan
M. Johnston & Paul J. Krupin, The 1989 Pacific Northwest Timber Compromise: An
Environmental Dispute Resolution Case Study of a Successful Battle That May Have
Lost the War, 27 WiLLAMETrE L. REv. 613 (1991) (criticizing the Oregon congressional delegation for failing to discuss options and negotiate a settlement with the disputants, usurping the decision-making role, and imposing a settlement that was
unacceptable to most of the "timber summit" participants).
40. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of Fiscal
Year 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 318(b)(3), (5), 103 Stat. 701, 745-47 (1989). Specifically, § 318(b)(3) forbade timber sales in areas identified for protection in the Forest
Service's SEIS, and also added an additional 3,200 acres of protection, § 318(b)(3), 103
Stat. at 746. Section 318(b)(5) forbade timber sales from the BLM lands identified in a
1987 agreement between BLM and the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife and
directed BLM to identify an additional 12 protected areas. § 318(b)(5), 103 Stat. at 74647.
41. Id. § 318(b)(2), 103 Stat. at 746. This was the first time United States law recognized ancient forests.
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and established citizen advisory boards to assist the agencies in making

timber sales.4 2 Section 318 also directed the Forest Service and the
BLM to sell 7.7 billion board feet of timber, 5.8 billion of which was
harvested from public lands in Oregon and Washington.4 3 One billion
one hundred million board feet of the timber was subject to court injunction." In order to reach these harvest levels, Congress included
section 318(b)(6)(A)" which eventually attracted the Supreme Court's
attention.46 Generally, that provision, in awkward prose, disclaimed
any intent to judge the "legal and factual adequacy" of the Forest Service and the BLM spotted owl plans and "determine[d] and direct[ed]" that managing Northwest forests according to the provisions
of the Hatfield-Adams compromise was "adequate consideration for
the purpose of meeting the statutory requirements" in the ongoing
spotted owl cases, identifying the cases by caption and file number.4 7
II.

THE ENSUING LITIGATION

The federal government moved quickly to invoke section 318 as
42. Id. § 318(c), 103 Stat. at 747-48.
43. Id. § 318(a)(1), 103 Stat. at 745.
44. § 318(f), 103 Stat. at 748-49. See also Sher & Hunting, supra note 22, at 472
("[S]ection 318 also required the plaintiffs in the lawsuit to agree to 'release' from litigation the disputed 1.1 billion board feet of fiscal year 1989 timber that had been enjoined
from sale by the court..
").
45. Section 318(b)(6)(A) provides:
Without passing on the legal and factual adequacy of the Final Supplement to
the Environmental Impact Statement for an Amendment to the Pacific Northwest
Regional Guide - Spotted Owl Guidelines and the accompanying Record of Decision issued by the Forest Service on December 8, 1988 or the December 22, 1987
agreement between the Bureau of Land Management and the Oregon Department
of Fish and Wildlife for management of the spotted owl, the Congress hereby determines and directs that management of areas according to subsections (b)(3) and
(b)(5) of this section on the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington
and Bureau of Land Management lands in western Oregon known to contain
northern spotted owls is adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the
statutory requirements that are the basis for the consolidated cases captioned Seattle Audubon Society et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-160 and Washington
Contract Loggers Assoc. et al., v. F. Dale Robertson, Civil No. 89-99 (order granting preliminary injunction) and the case Portland Audubon Society et al., v. Manuel Lujan, Jr., Civil No. 87-1160-FR. The guidelines adopted by subsections
(b)(3) and (b)(5) of this section shall not be subject to judicial review by any court
of the United States.
§ 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747.
46. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407 (1992).
47. § 318(b)(6)(A), 103 Stat. at 747 (the full text appears at supra note 45).
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grounds for dismissing the litigation pending in the western district of
Washington. In November 1989, District Judge William Dwyer vacated the preliminary injunction granted eight months earlier.4" He
concluded that section 318 was a temporary modification of environmental laws and rejected the environmentalists' claims that section 318
was an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers.49 Six weeks
later, Judge Helen Frye dismissed the BLM litigation in the district
court of Oregon, rejecting a similar constitutional challenge. 5"
The environmentalists filed a consolidated appeal to the Ninth Circuit and won a reversal in September 1990.51 The court found that
section 318 raised serious constitutional concerns. Article III of the
United States Constitution assigns judicial power to resolve cases and
controversies to the federal courts, not Congress. 52 To the extent that
section 318 instructs federal courts to reach a particular result in specifically identified pending cases, it may supplant Article III.1 3 The
Ninth Circuit's primary concern was whether section 318 changed the
laws underlying the pending cases or prescribed a rule of decision in
pending cases without changing the underlying statutes.5 4 The former
is a permissible incident of Congress' authority over the jurisdiction of
the federal courts, even for the purpose of terminating litigation, while
the latter is an unconstitutional intrusion on the judicial function.5 5
The Ninth Circuit contrasted two mid-nineteenth century cases in its
analysis of whether section 318 amounted to an unconstitutional congressional usurpation of the courts' judicial function. In Pennsylvania
v. The Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Co. ,56 the Supreme Court upheld
48. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, Nos. C89-160WD & C89-99(T)WD, 1989
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15005, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 6, 1989).
49. Id. at *6-7.
50. Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,018,
20,018 (D. Or. Dec. 21, 1989).
51. See Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1990).
52. Id. at 1314.
53. Id. at 1316.
54. Id.
55.

1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 2.10, at 124-126 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing the

interaction between Congress and the judiciary and concluding that "Congress may not
decide the merits of a case under the guise of limiting jurisdiction."); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 3-5, at 49-50 (2d ed. 1988)("[I]f Congress
does not purport to alter the governing procedural and substantive law, Congress can-

not force its interpretation of that law upon the federal courts in particular cases.").
56.

59 U.S. (19 How.) 421 (1855).
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a congressional act that reversed the Court's earlier holding that a
bridge was an impermissible obstruction to navigation on the ground
that the statute changed the previous law, making the bridge no longer
an obstruction in law, even if it remained so in fact.57 Recent applications of the Wheeling Bridge rule have ratified statutory changes
designed to eliminate previously successful governmental litigation defenses58 and authorize construction of a highway previously enjoined
for violating environmental laws.5 9
United States v. Klein,' however, limits the Wheeling Bridge rule.
In Klein, the Court held unconstitutional a statute that directed the
courts to consider a presidential pardon as evidence of disloyalty during the Civil War, thus rendering a claimant ineligible for compensation under a statute allowing loyal non-combatants in the South to
recover for war-related losses.6 1 Because the Supreme Court earlier
ruled that a presidential pardon was evidence of loyalty under the statute,6 2 and the claimant in Klein already had prevailed before the Court
of Claims,63 the Klein Court ruled that Congress attempted to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way and thereby
impermissibly encroached on the Court's Article III powers."6
The Ninth Circuit determined that section 318 was more like Klein
than Wheeling Bridge because it did not expressly or implicitly repeal
57. Id. at 430.
58. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 405 (1980) (upholding a
1978 statute authorizing relitigation of whether Sioux lands were taken without just
compensation despite a 1942 case denying jurisdiction over the issue on grounds that
Congress has the power to waive an otherwise valid legal defense to a claim against the
government).
59. Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1437 (9th Cir. 1989) (upholding an
appropriations law directing the Secretary of Transportation to build a highway
"notwithstanding" environmental requirements which enjoined the project because "[i]t
is fully within Congress' prerogative legislatively to alter the reach of the laws it passes,
assuming no constitutional principles are thereby violated").
60. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). See generally Gordon G. Young, Congressional
Regulation of Federal Courts' Jurisdictionand Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 Wis. L. REv. 1189 (analyzing thoroughly the Court's holding in Klein and its
present implications).
61. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146-47.
62. United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 542-43 (1870) (holding that a
pardon is evidence of loyalty for compensation purposes).
63. The Court of Claims awarded the claimant $125,300 for captured cotton bales
in Wilson v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 559, 567 (1868), modified, 7 Ct. Cl. vii (1871), affid
sub nom. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
64. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146-47.
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or amend the environmental statutes underlying the litigation. 65 Instead, the court concluded that the provision directed the court to
reach a specific result and compelled certain factual findings under existing law in pending litigation.6 6 Although the court noted that a presumption of constitutionality applies to ambiguous statutes, it rejected
the government's suggestion that section 318 could be construed as a
temporary repeal of the underlying environmental statutes because that
result would amount to an implied repeal effectuated by an appropriations measure, impermissible under the Supreme Court's famous ruling
in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill.6 7

Despite the fact that section 318 was a geographically limited, temporary measure and that the Ninth Circuit's decision enjoined only sixteen timber sales,68 the Supreme Court granted certiorari nine months
after the provision expired. 69 Given the limited practical significance
of both the statute and the court injunction, it seemed likely that the
Court chose to speak on this issue in order to clarify the extent to
which the Klein rule restricts Congress' ability to direct the results of
pending litigation.
Unfortunately, the Court failed to elaborate on the proper role for
the Klein rule. Justice Thomas' opinion for a unanimous Supreme
Court identified the issue in Robertson not in constitutional terms, but
as a question of simple statutory interpretation. According to Justice
Thomas, section 318's unfortunate use of the language "Congress
hereby directs and determines" was not designed to influence the specific results of pending litigation, but rather to "direct" a change in
law. 70 The Court also found that the fact that the statutes amended by
section 318 were not even mentioned in the appropriations measure did
not make the provision an impermissible implied repeal.7 1 The Court
reasoned that naming the cases by caption and file number to identify
the underlying statutory changes worked by section 318 and cured the
65. Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Robertson, 914 F.2d at 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1990).
66. Id.
67. 437 U.S. 153 (1978), cited in Robertson, 914 F.2d at 1317. See infra note 105
and accompanying text.

68. See Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 112 S. Ct. 1407, 1412 n.3 (1992)
("there remains a live controversy... over the 16 sales offered during the fiscal year
1990 .... ).
69. 111 S. Ct. 2886 (1991).
70. Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1413-14.
71. Id. at 1414.
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failure to name the underlying statutes.72 Thus, based on the maxim
that specific provisions govern general ones, section 318 effectively
modified pertinent provisions in five unidentified statutes. 3
Because Justice Thomas clearly saw the congressional intent behind
section 318 as an intent to change environmental law, he was unsympathetic to the environmentalists' claims that the provision was an implied repeal by an appropriation rider. While Justice Thomas
reaffirmed the rule that repeals by implication are disfavored in appropriations statutes, he found that the changes affected by section 318
were "not only clear, but express."'7 4 The Court hinted that courts
must interpret statutes like section 318 to amend the underlying statute
under the rule favoring statutory interpretation that saves an act's constitutionality, even if the case did not involve express changes.7 5
The Court's interpretation of section 318 as a clear, express, temporary modification of environmental law, rather than an implied repeal
of existing statutes or a directive for the courts to achieve certain results in the referenced cases, allowed the Court to avoid clarifying the
limits that Klein imposes on Congress' ability to influence the results of
ongoing litigation.7 6 Thus, in Robertson the Court failed to settle any
constitutional issues of separation of powers. Instead, it involved a
narrow issue of statutory interpretation of a temporary, geographically
confined appropriations rider. One wonders why the Supreme Court
has time for such a relatively insignificant matter.

III.

THE LEGACY

Robertson has had little effect on the battle over the fate of the
72.

Id. ("The reference to Seattle Audubon and Portland Audubon, however,

served only to identify the five 'statutory requirements that are the basis for' these cases
namely, pertinent provisions of META, NEPA, NFMA, FLPMA and OCLA.").
73. Id. (citing Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15 (1978), for the proposition
that specific provisions qualify general ones).
74. Id. (reaffirming Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 190 (1978), and
relying on United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 222 (1980), for the proposition that
Congress "may amend substantive law in an appropriations, as long as it does so
clearly").
75. 112 S. Ct. at 1414 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30
(1937)).
76. Id. ("Because we conclude that [§ 318] did amend applicable law, we need not
consider whether the [Ninth Circuit's] reading of Klein is correct."). The Court also
refused to address amicus Public Citizen's contention that even a change in the underlying law would be unconstitutional if it had the exclusive effect of changing issues under
litigation because it had not been raised in the courts below. Id. at 1415.
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Northwest's ancient forests. The case freed only sixteen timber sales
from judicial injunction.7 7 And because section 318 expired in 1990
without being reenacted, the Supreme Court's decision seems to be
only a curious footnote in what is now a five-year-long litigation struggle.78 In fact, by the time the Court decided Robertson, both the Forest Service and the BLM Pacific forests were under injunction for
violating the environmental laws which section 318 had only temporarily modified.79 The Forest Service estimated that it would be unable to
respond to the injunction until fiscal year 1994.80 To lift the injunction, the Forest Service must remedy the statutory violations of NEPA
and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) while also satisfying the requirements of the Endangered Species Act,"' because the
northern spotted owl became a threatened species in mid-1990,8 2 when
77. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
78. See Sher & Hunting, supra note 22, at 452-85 (addressing the Court's failure to
adopt legitimate interpretations of appropriations riders to allow for meaningful judicial
review).
79. Judge Dwyer enjoined Forest Service timber sales for violating the National
Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-87 (1988 and Supp. III 1991), on
May 23, 1991 in Seattle Audubon Soc'y v. Evans, 771 F. Supp. 1081, 1096 (W.D. Wash.
1991), af#'d, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991). Judge Dwyer stated:
More is involved here than a simple failure by an agency to comply with its governing statute. The most recent violation of NFMA exemplifies a deliberate and
systematic refusal by the Forest Service and the [Fish and Wildlife Service] to comply with the laws protecting wildlife. This is not the doing of the scientists, foresters, rangers, and others at the working levels of these agencies. It reflects decisions
made by higher authorities in the executive branch of government.
Id. at 1090.
After issuing a temporary restraining order on January 29, 1992, see Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Lujan, 784 F. Supp. 786, 792 (D. Or. 1992), Judge Frye permanently enjoined the BLM timber sales for violating NEPA on June 8, 1992, in Portland Audubon
Soc'y v. Lujan, 795 F. Supp. 1489, 1510-11 (D. Or. 1992).
80. No spotted owl solution in 1993; murrelet threatens, 17 PUBLIC LANDS NEws,
Oct. 15, 1992 (reporting that the Forest Service expects to issue an EIS in response to
Judge Dwyer's injunction by August 1993 and noting that additional harvest restrictions may be imposed by the proposed listing of the marbled murrelet as a threatened
species).
81. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988 and Supp. III 1991); see generally DANIEL J.
ROHLF, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION (1989).
82. See Determination of Threatened Status for the Spotted Owl, 55 Fed. Reg.
26,114 (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). Cf. Northern Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F.
Supp. 479, 483 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (ruling that United States Fish & Wildlife Service's
refusal to list the northern spotted owl under the Endangered Species Act was arbitrary,
capricious, and contrary to law).
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Robertson was pending before the Ninth Circuit. Nothing in the
Supreme Court's decision addresses compliance with those environmental laws.
Thus, Robertson may resemble many of the Supreme Court's early
NEPA decisions, which had little effect beyond the facts of the case.83
Because Robertson involved the statutory construction of an expired
statute, it is not a case of enduring substantive importance for the Pacific Northwest's forests. Instead, Robertson's significance lies in what
it reveals about the Court's readiness to accept congressional power to
control the results of pending litigation by altering the underlying statutory premises of the litigation. The case also reflects the Court's unwillingness to impose any sort of legislative due process by requiring
Congress to abide by its own rules. Because Robertson was a public
84
land law case, involving Congress' power under the property clause,
it is possible that the first result may be peculiar to the Constitution's
Article IV power. The second result, however, may have long-term
importance because the attitude it conveys countenances "lawmaking
by logrolling," which historically has allowed small interest groups to
dominate public land law.
Congressional power to affect the results of pending litigation may
seem unfettered in the wake of Robertson. Section 318 failed to identify any of the environmental statutes it amended; it "determined" that
its one-year statutory substitute was "adequate consideration" under
those statutes; and it "directed" courts identified by caption and file
number to achieve results consistent with its temporary substitution.8 5
A number of its sponsors actually described section 318's effects as reversing the court injunctions restricting timber harvests.86 It is hard to
83. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA at Twenty: Mimicry and Recruitment in
Environmental Law, 21 ENVTL. L. 485, 496-503 (1990) (arguing that NEPA survived
the Supreme Court's unbroken string of 12 decisions from 1975 to 1989, which consistently rejected environmental groups' NEPA interpretations, because the cases had relatively little effect as they were based on excruciatingly complicated facts; they were
unrepresentative of the normal range of environmental issues; and they were based on
selective and ideological review controlled by the Justice Department).
84. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2 provides in relevant part: "The Congress shall
have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States... "
85. The full text of § 318(b)(6)(A) is set out in supra note 45.
86. 135 CONG. REc. S12,961, 12,962 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Gorton) ("[l]t [section 318] directs release of 1.1 billion board feet of timber sales out of
the 1.8 billion presently unavailable due to court injunctions .... ."); 135 CONG. REC.
H6532 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. AuCoin) ("What we are dealing with
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imagine a more clear congressional attempt to establish "a rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress," which the Klein
Court held constitutionally impermissible.8 7 Nevertheless, Justice
Thomas distinguished Klein by declaring that section 318 actually
worked an underlying statutory change, however inartfully accomplished."8 No reasoning accompanied this declaration.
After Robertson, what remains of Klein's limit on congressional control over pending cases probably is restricted to altering results in cases
involving either individual constitutional rights 9 or executive powers.' ° The latter is most likely, given the Supreme Court's recent inter91
est in protecting Article II power from legislative arrogation.
Article III may also limit congressional power to control litigation
results. 92 Robertson involved the property clause power, the limits of
is an injunction which has been imposed on our region ... ."); 135 CONG. REC. H6531

(daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989) (statement of Rep. Dicks) ("Court injunctions forced by radical
preservationists have reduced the timber sale in the Pacific Northwest by billions of
board feet.").
87. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146.
88. Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1414.
89. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONsTrrUIONAL CHoICES 55-58 (1985); Paul M.
Bator, Withdrawing Jurisdictionfrom FederalCourts, 7 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 31,
33 (1984); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1371-74 (1953).
90. See Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147 (discussing legislative interference with
executive pardon power); TRIBE, supra note 55, § 4-11 at 255-56 (explaining the relationship between the executive branch's pardon power, and the legislative branch's ability to delegate prosecutors to review executive actions).
91. See, eg., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 732-34 (1986) (determining that Congress may not vest executive powers in an official not subject to congressional removal
except by impeachment); Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 956-59 (1983) (ruling that presentment clause forbids congressional veto of Executive regulations); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138-43 (1976) (holding that appointments clause forbids Congress from appointing voting members of the Federal Election
Commission).
92. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View ofArticle III" Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REv. 205, 246-52 (1985); Lea
Brilmayer & Stefan Underhill, CongressionalObligation to Providea Forumfor Constitutional Claims: DiscriminatoryJurisdictionalRules and the Conflict ofLaws, 69 VA. L.
REv. 819, 824 (1983); Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of FederalCourt Jurisdiction: A Guided Questfor the Original Understandingof Article II, 132 U. PA. L. REv.
741, 750, 855 (1984); Gerald Gunther, CongressionalPower to Curtail Federal Court
Jurisdiction:An OpinionatedGuide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REv. 895, 90116 (1984); Leonard G. Ratner, MajoritarianConstraints on JudicialReview: Congressional Control of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REv. 929, 932-36 (1982);
Lawrence Gene Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: ConstitutionalLim-
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which are defined by Congress.93 Congress may possess greater authority to affect the results of pending public land cases under this Article IV power than it does under its Article I powers.94 This
interpretation of Robertson allows for some judicial limits on Congress'
Article I power when, in Justice Thomas' words, a change in law
"swe[eps] no more broadly, or little more broadly, than the range of
applications at issue in the pending cases." 95 The case may, therefore,
contain less than first meets the eye in terms of wholesale judicial approval of congressional interference with pending cases.
A potentially more enduring legacy of Robertson is more disturbing.
Rent-seeking legislation96 that promotes narrow private interests associated with commodity production from federal lands historically has
characterized public land law. 97 Under this system, relatively few
Western Congressmen could, through control of the House and Senate
Interior Committees, successfully promote policies having greater utility to their local constituents than to the public at large. 9" However, as
itations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95
HARV. L. REV. 17, 23-24 (1981).
93. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 536 (1976) ("[D]eterminations under the
Property Clause are entrusted primarily to the judgment of Congress."); United States
v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29-30 (1940) ("The power over the public land thus
entrusted to Congress is without limitations."); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523,
537 (1911) ("All the public lands of the nation are held in trust for the people of the
whole country. And it is not for the courts to say how that trust shall be administered.
That is for Congress to determine."); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526,
537-38 (1840) ("Congress shall have the same power over [territorial land] as over any
other property belonging to the United States; and this power is vested in Congress
").
without limitation ....
94. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Separation of Powers, Legislative Vetoes, and the Public

Lands, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 559, 564-74 (1985).
95. Robertson, 112 S.Ct. at 1415.
96. Rent-seeking behavior employs the political process to produce results furthering individual or group interests. The rewards are "economic rents" - payment for use
of an economic asset in excess of its market price. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New

Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 879-80 (1991) (outlining the contours of "public
choice theory," which views the legislative process as controlled by rent-seeking efforts).
97. See Perry R. Hagenstein, The FederalLands Today: Uses and Limits, in RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS 74, 83-96 (Sterling Brubaker ed., 1984).
98.

See, e.g., DANIEL McCOOL, COMMAND OF THE WATERS: IRON TRIANGLES,

FEDERAL WATER DEVELOPMENT, AND INDIAN WATER 9, 28, 72-80 (1987) (discussing the way western congressmen dominated committees responsible for authorizing
reclamation projects); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST

AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 148 (1986) (quoting Illinois Senator Paul Douglass,
who unsuccessfully opposed the Colorado River storage project, as stating: "There ex-
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Eastern Congressmen assume a greater interest in public land issues,
such as wilderness and species preservation, Western logrolling to
maintain commodity production and preserve local economic subsidies
becomes more difficult.9 9 Some clever Western Congressman, such as
Oregon's Senator Mark Hatfield and former Congressman Les
AuCoin, responded by increasing the use of the congressional appropriations process.l°° Section 318 was only one of a series of appropriations measures that maintained heavy logging of ancient forests
throughout the 1980s."'

x

In Robertson, the Court approved legislation by appropriations rider
despite House and Senate rules proscribing legislative changes in appropriations statutes.1 "2 Congress established these rules because the
appropriations process provides little opportunity for review and comists an interesting tendency for Senators in those [western] states to congregate on the
Committee on the Interior and Indian Affairs and the Committee on Appropriations,
which consider irrigation and reclamation bills. There is sort of an affinity, just as sugar
draws fies."); DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY AND THE

GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST 281 (1985) (alleging that the real power in the
West resides with small, cohesive, private groups that have made the federal bureaucracy their servant).
99. A good example of recent legislation enacted over the objection of commodity
interests is §§ 3401-06 of the 1992 Omnibus Water bill. That legislation dramatically
increases the cost of water from the Bureau of Reclamation's Central Valley Project,
reauthorizes the project's purposes to include environmental protection, prohibits new
uses of federal water except for fish and wildlife, and establishes a $50 million fish and
wildlife habitat restoration. The bill passed over the strenuous objections of California
Senator John Seymour. See Philip A. Davis, Water Bill Heads to Bush's Desk Over
Farm Interests' Protests, 50 Cong. Quart. Weekly Rep. 3150 (Oct. 10, 1992).
100. 135 CONG. REC. H6506 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989) (remarks of Rep. AuCoin);
135 CONG. REC. S8790 (daily ed. July 26, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield); Kathie
Durbin, Special Report, Northwest Forests: Day of Reckoning, Politics helped delay
N.W. timber managementplans, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 15, 1990, at 7, 11 ("From 1986
through 1989, Rep. AuCoin and Sen. Hatfield intervened through the appropriations
process to boost the cut higher than even the Forest Service had requested").
101. See generally Linda M. Bolduan, The HatfieldRiders: Eliminatingthe Role of
the Courts in Environmental Decision Making, 20 ENVTL. L. 329 (1990) (describing
appropriations riders enacted from 1985 to 1989 which precluded judicial review of
Forest Service and BLM decisions in Oregon).
102. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 359-60 (1979) ("The rules of both
Houses prohibit legislation from being added to an appropriation bill.") (internal quotations omitted). InAndrus, the Supreme Court refused to subject appropriation requests
to EIS requirements on the ground that doing so "would have the deleterious effect of
circumventing and eliminating the careful distinction Congress has maintained between
appropriation and legislation." Id at 364. According to the Court, that distinction
turns on the fact that "appropriation requests do not 'propose' federal actions at all;
they instead fund actions already proposed." Id at 362.
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ment or meaningful debate on substantive provisions. When riders are
attached to omnibus funding legislation at the eleventh hour, a few
members of Congress may be able to use the pressure of the termination of annual government funding to dictate rent-seeking legislation." 3 Robertson indicates that not one member of the Supreme
Court sees a judicial role in promoting more public-regarding legislation by holding Congress to its own rules.' 4
It was particularly appropriate to impose the rule against legislating
in an appropriations bill on section 318 because a conscientious legislator could have supported the measure without knowing that it effectively waived compliance with laws like NEPA and NFMA. Thus,
section 318 was more objectionable than, for example, the provision
which exempted the Tellico Dam from the Endangered Species Act.
The Tellico Dam exemption noted the existence of the Endangered
Species Act and other laws, yet it still authorized the Tennessee Valley
Authority to complete construction, operate, and maintain the Tellico
Dam and Reservoir project.10 ' No such unambiguous exemption appeared in section 318 and, in fact, the floor debates emphasized the fact
that the provision preserved judicial review, not that it exempted timber sales from environmental laws." 6 One senator complained that the
manner of the bill's presentation prevented senators from knowing the
103. For example, in late 1992, an appropriations rider was used to circumvent the
scientific process the government normally uses to allocate research funds for experimental drugs. After the National Institute of Health declined to expedite its consideration of an experimental AIDS vaccine, 9 p-160, former Louisiana Senator Russell Long,
representing the research group, approached Senators Sam Nunn (D. Ga.) and John
Warner (R. Va.), who added a rider to the Defense appropriations bill, earmarking $20
million for 9p-160's large scale clinical trials. The rider received no opposition and little
debate. Lobbyist gets Congressto fund researchfor rebuffed AIDS vaccine, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 20, 1992, at A12.
104. On the role of courts in promoting legislative deliberation, or "due process of
lawmaking," see generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudenceof
Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. Rav. 873, 914-24 (1987); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 222-35 (1975).
105. Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 9669, 93 Stat. 437, 449-50 (1979). See generally Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the
SnailDarter: An Environmental Law ParadigmandIts Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 805 (1986).
106. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REc. S12,978-79 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1989) (remarks of Sen.
Hatfield); 135 CONG. REc. S12,961-964 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Gorton); 135 CONG. REc. S12,960-61 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Adams); 135
CONG. REc. S12,951-52 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Byrd); 135 CONG.
REC. H6531-32 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989) (remarks of Rep. Dicks); 135 CONG. REc. 6531
(daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989) (remarks of Rep. Smith); 135 CONG. REc. H65 (daily ed. Oct. 3,
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content of the appropriations bill prior to the debate. 10 7 That the
Supreme Court unanimously approved such a process is distressing.
Because public land resources are concentrated in the West, legislative logrolling is a typical method for making public land law there.'
This has proved to be a costly way of allocating public land resources,
because it regularly leads to underpricing of public goods, such as
water, grazing land, and timber.'0 9 When public land issues become
nationalized, for example the Arctic Wildlife Refuge, I I0 rent-seeking
legislation is more difficult to enact. Now the publicity surrounding
1989) (statement of Rep. Swift); 135 CONG. REC. 6508 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1989) (remarks
of Rep. Vento).
107. 135 CONG. REc. S8788 (daily ed. July 26, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Armstrong).
This is quite similar to the "dark of the night" methods by which the language exempting the Tellico Dam was inserted into the 1980 appropriations statute, see supra note
105 and accompanying text. See Sher & Hunting, supra note 22, at 442-44. But at least
in that situation the senators voting on the measure could reasonably discern from the
text of the measure that the dam was being exempted from environmental laws.
108.

See PAUL W. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 770

(1968):
Retrospectively, critics may see that many blunders were made in legislating for
the administration and disposal of the public lands. Too many laws were shaped
largely in the hurly-burly of discussion on the floor of the Senate and House with
numerous amendments being added, deletions made, and words changed without
careful attention to the effects of these alterations. When the differences between
the versions of the two Houses were ironed out in conference and the measures
reported back for final adoption, time was often short and they were too speedily
approved. Hidden jokes, subtle changes in meaning, the removal of administrative
officers needed to carry out their responsibilities effectively were not uncommon.
109. On below-cost timber sales, see generally Kenneth R. Barrett, Note, Section
6(k) of the National ForestManagement Act: The Bottom Line on Below-Cost Timber
Sales?, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 373; James F. Morrison, The NationalForest Management
Act and Below Cost Timber Sales: Determining the Economic Suitability of Landfor
Timber Production, 17 ENVTL. L. 557 (1987); Michael Frederick Kline, The National
Chainsaw Massacre: Below Cost Timber Sales in the NationalForests, 13 B.C. ENVTL.
Aiu. L. REV. 553 (1986).
On grazing, see, eg., DENZEL FERGUSON & NANCY FERGUSON, SACRED COWS AT
THE PUBLIC TROUGH (1983); LYNN JACOBS, WASTE OF THE WEST: PUBLIC LANDS

RANCHING (1992); George C. Coggins, The Law of PublicRange Land Management V."
Prescriptionsfor Reform, 14 ENVTL. L. 497 (1984).
On water, see generally Reisner, supra note 98; Janet E. McKinnon, Water to Waste:
IrrationalDecisionmaking in the American West, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 503

(1986).
110. See Bill Nichols, Oil potential spawns fears in Alaska tribe; Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge, USA TODAY, Aug. 29, 1990, at 1IA; Should the Bush Administration
Withdraw Supportfor Oil Exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge?, DET.
FREE PRESS, Apr. 1, 1989, at A15.
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the listing of the spotted owl under the Endangered Species Act... has
elevated the ancient forest campaign to a national issue.1 12 As a result,3
control by appropriation rider is no longer politically possible.'
Whether the remnant old growth forests remain as fish and wildlife
habitat and watershed protection or are logged to maintain public subsidies for timber-dependent Northwest communities will now be the
subject of congressional deliberation and debate." 4 Public deliberation
and debate will ensure better informed decision making than that
which produced section 318 of the 1990 Department of the Interior
Appropriations Act. That political reality may comfort those concerned about the Northwest's ancient forests, but Robertson invites legislative rent-seeking through the appropriations process in the
allocation of other, less national, issues. Some of these could involve
public lands, "' but it is more likely they will concern local public
works projects, an unsettling reality in an era characterized by the long
shadow of budget deficits.
In Robertson, the Court failed to seize the opportunity to impose
I11. See John Lancaster, Northern Spotted Owl is 'Threatened', Administration's
Concerns About Logging Delay Protection Plan, NEWSDAY, June 23, 1990, at Z; Carl
Nolte, Spotted Owl Declared 'Threatened', S.F. CHRON., June 23, 1990, at Al.
112. See Johnston & Krupin, supra note 39, at 614-15. Environmentalists made a
conscious decision to nationalize the old growth forest issue because most of the surviving old growth timber was on public lands. They actively pursued this goal through
various means, including driving a logging truck with a 730 year-old Douglas fir tree
measuring seven-and-one-half feet in diameter across the country. WILLIAM DIETRICH, THE FINAL FOREST 147-52 (1992).
113. See Sher & Hunting, supra note 22, at 487-90 (discussing congressional consideration of the 1991 Interior Appropriations Bill which contained no rider limiting judicial review).
114. See Deep disagreements kill off old growth bill for this year, PUBLIC LANDS
NEWS, Oct. 1, 1992, at 2-3 (players in the old growth controversy are preparing for
1993, after the 102d Congress failed to pass old growth legislation); Old growth bill
gridlock continues amongHouse Democrats, PUBLIC LANDS NEWS, Sept. 17, 1992, at 45 (Congressmen are unable to reach agreement on core issues of old growth legislation
including a guaranteed timber sale, an old growth reserve, and legal sufficiency
language).
115. Higher grazing fees, lower revenue from mineral development on federal lands,
higher fees for hard rock miners, modest reforms of the 1872 mining law and a reduction in below-cost timber sales were considered by the committees negotiating the appropriations bill for fiscal year 1993. Westerners face tough choices in appropriations
conference, PUBLIC LANDS NEWS, Sept. 17, 1992, at 8. The resulting appropriations
bill added a S100 holding fee for each 1872 mining law claim, cut $37.5 million from the
state share of federal mineral revenues and did not increase grazing fees. Appropriations
deal drops rangefee hike; trims state loss, PUBLIC LANDS NEWS, Oct. 1, 1992, at 3-4.
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Congress' own legislative standards upon itself. As a consequence, the
Court sanctioned congressional logrolling, thus conforming to the
grim, selfish, rent-seeking model of legislative behavior popularized by
Public Choice theorists.11 6 Therefore, Robertson fosters behavior that
confirms the cynical Public Choice notion that government in general,
and legislation in particular, is merely the product of contracts with
interest groups.1 I 7 The Justices themselves may not subscribe to Public Choice theory, but decisions like Robertson help spread that perspective throughout the legal academy.
Finally, the language and style of Robertson warrants mention. Justice Thomas repeatedly invokes maxims to resolve the issues of the
case. Through the use of sterile rules such as "the specific controls the
general" and "statutes should be construed to uphold their constitutionality," I8 Justice Thomas resolves the case without considering the
overriding environmental and separation of powers issues raised by
Robertson. A hasty review of Justice Thomas' opinion might allow one
to miss completely the fact that this case involved spotted owls, ancient
forests, and public land law. 119 This detached view of the environment
is one that Justice Thomas shares with his colleagues. 20
What is perhaps more unsettling in the Robertson opinion is the uncompromising, almost condescending attitude it conveys. Justice
Thomas' opinion might be summarized as follows: "Section 318 was
not an attempt to influence the results of pending cases; it simply
changed the law (without clearly saying so); maxims dictate constitutionality." It is all so clear, just as it was to Humpty Dumpty, who
116. Public Choice theory applies economic methods to political science, generally
assuming that self-interested, rent-seeking behavior dominates politics. See generally
DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL

INTRODUCTION (1991).

117. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The IndependentJudiciaryin an
Interest-GroupPerspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877-79 (1975) (discussing the impact
of interest groups on legislation and government).
118. See Robertson, 112 S. Ct. at 1414; see also supra text accompanying notes 73 &
75. More than forty years ago, Karl Llewellyn exposed the fallacies of using maxims to
interpret statutes by showing that there are two opposing maxims on almost every
point. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory ofAppellate Decision and the Rule or
CanonsAbout How StatutesAre to be Construed,3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 401-06 (1950).
119. See Blumm, supra note 21, at 612-13.
120. See, eg., Richard I. Goldsmith & William C. Banks, Environmental Values:
InstitutionalResponsibility and the Supreme Court, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.1 (1983);
Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the
Supreme Court'sEnvironmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REv. 343 (1989).
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remarked to Alice that "When I use a word,...
it means just what I
' 12 1
choose it to mean - neither more nor less."
The opinion is also wooden and formalistic. Divorced from all considerations save his maxims, Justice Thomas resembles, to an unsettling degree, the judicial mind of a century ago. The tone, clarity, and
certainty of Robertson recalls the Court's decision ninety-seven years
earlier in United States v. E.C. Knight Co., where the Court drew the
infamous distinction between indirect and direct effects on commerce."2 That wooden distinction allowed the Court to hold that
manufacturing was not commerce, therefore Congress could not break
up the sugar monopoly under the Sherman Antitrust Act. 12 3 Manufacturing is not commerce; appropriation riders "directing" new standards for cases identified by caption and file number do not "prescribe
a rule of decision." As Yogi Berra might have said, maybe it's deja vu
all over again. If so, Robertson will be remembered more for what it
foreshadowed about Justice Thomas' formalistic judicial philosophy 2 4
than for what the decision might seem to indicate about Congress' constitutional power to control the results of pending cases or its authority
to liquidate, by appropriations rider, a small portion of the remaining
old growth forests of the Pacific Northwest.

121. LEWIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE: ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 269 (Martin Gardner, ed.)(New
American Library 1974)(1865 & 1872).

122. 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895).
123. Id. at 16-18.
124. For an overview of nineteenth century formalistic legal thought, see MORTON
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 16-18 (1992).

Electronic
copy available
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986598
Electronic
copy available
at:at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986598

Electronic
copy available
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986598
Electronic
copy available
at:at:https://ssrn.com/abstract=2986598

